Inexperience Ruined Luna Project as Creator Injected Over $2.3 Billion into Losing Position

Following about 99% plunge in the value of Terra Luna Coin and the global outcry for the Luna Foundation Guard (LFG) to use its supposed reserve to acquire and burn its now over 6.5 trillion Luna coins, the LFG has come out to state it does not have the said reserve anymore.

According to a statement released by LFG on Monday, the foundation reserve used to comprise of 80,394 $BTC, 39,914 $BNB, 26,281,671 $USDT, 23,555,590 $USDC, 1,973,554 $AVAX, 697,344 $UST and  1,691,261 $LUNA. However, on May 8, 2022, when TerraUSD (“UST”), the main product (stablecoin) of the Terra network, started declining below its US$1 peg, LFG said it began injecting its over 80,000 Bitcoin into the market in order to halt the now record-decline.

This, it said was done by sending its reserved BTC and other digital assets to counterparties to allow them place trades in large size and on short notice for the Foundation.

Breaking down how the reserve was exhausted, the Foundation said it directly sold 26,281,671 $USDT and  23,555,590 $USDC for an aggregate of 50,200,071 $UST. While 52,189 $BTC was transferred to a counterparty for trade, out of which 5,313 $BTC was returned for an aggregate 1,515,689,462 $UST.

This continues on May 10 and 12 until the Foundation had depleted its reserve to 313 $BTC, 39,914 $BNB, 1,973,554 $AVAX, 1,847,079,725 $UST, 222,713,007 $LUNA (out of which 221,021,746 is presently staked with validators).

LFG Inexperience and Eventual Failure

In financial markets, one of the first principles aspiring traders are taught is never to add to a losing position. It simply means no matter the situation, traders should not average down a losing long position or average up a losing short position, like in the case of LFG.

Luna with a combined reserve of about $3.5 billion was trying to plug a broad-based losing short position valued at about $18.68 billion for UST and $40 billion for Luna coin by continuously averaging up despite limited risk at the time.

Here is the Logic

If LFG had kept its reserve, it would have been able to purchase and burn at a cheaper rate compared to when it first injected over 52,000 BTC on May 8 when UST was just $0.9953 and Luna coin was $65 per coin. In fact, it appears as if it was the huge fund transferred to counterparties on May 8 that triggered UST concerns among investors aware of the transaction, and subsequently, the eventual disaster that follows going by the chart below. Luna coin-backed UST plunged on May 10, again likely instigated by those in the know of the LFG situation.

Sending huge amounts of BTC and other digital assets to counterparties in an unregulated cryptocurrency space allows for aggressive insider dealings by those LFG trusted. People familiar with the situation likely told cryptocurrency whales and other investors about the Foundation’s struggle to stay afloat, hence the continuous selloff that eventually depleted the Foundation’s remaining reserve.